This distinguished gathering brings together persons who are an essential instrument for the functioning of parliamentary democracy. I therefore deem it a privilege to be asked to inaugurate it.

A Whip is defined as ‘an official appointed to maintain discipline among, secure attendance of, and give necessary information to, members of his party’. Each of these is essential for the proper functioning of a legislature. This is recognised by convention and is sanctified by an Act of Parliament.

It is said that whips ‘make a House’ and ‘keep a House’. They have multiple functions:

• Facilitate the functioning of the legislature and optimise its output.
• Be the channel for communicating party policy, on a day to day basis, to the rank and file of the party in the legislature and function as barometer for gauging their opinion;
• Act as counsellors to their Members and advisors to party leadership;
• Function as the channel for dispensing favours and for enforcing discipline.

Knowledge of human nature and amiability are considered essential requirements for whips. They must know when to cajole, when to persuade, and when to threaten. One recent study has highlighted their role ‘as arm-twister, bully and Machiavelli all rolled into one’.

Any commentary on the functioning of our parliamentary system is therefore, by implication, a comment on the efficacy or otherwise of the institution of whips. A generalised assessment, however, does not provide us all the answers, particularly with regard to their primary function touching upon their role in the functioning of legislatures.

Why do democracies have elected legislatures? What purpose do they serve? The answer to the first question lies in the term ‘representative and participatory governance’. The second was answered by Dr. Sarvapelli Radhakrishnan, the first Chairman of the Rajya Sabha. ‘Parliament’, he observed, ‘is not only a legislative but also a deliberative body’. The first is driven by the government of the day; the latter by public opinion and opposition pressure. This point was authoritatively stated by Sir Ivor Jennings:

‘The true function of the House is to question and debate the policy of the Government. In doing so it can bring home to the Government the unpopularity of a particular line of policy. Democratic Government rests upon public opinion’.

Thus deliberation is essential for three reasons:

• Effective oversight on the work of the government;
• Explaining policy to opposition parties and the public;
• Informing the government of opposition and public concerns.

The extent to which these functions are discharged is less a matter of opinion and more of facts.

The basic principles of parliamentary government are well known. The government shall, as long as it can maintain a majority, be able to secure such legal powers as it considers necessary for administration and that the minority, however small, shall be able to criticise that administration. The spirit of the system requires that stout opposition be combined with cooperation so that both the majority and the minority are able to discharge their respective functions.

The yardstick of public expectations is the only way to measure the effectiveness of the functioning of our legislatures. How successful have our parliamentary institutions been in making the system work? The story is told in data publicly available:

• The number of sittings in the Rajya Sabha has come down from an annual average of 90.5 in the first decade 1952-61 to 71.3 in the decade 1992-2001, a decline of 20 per cent. The comparative figures for the Lok Sabha are 124.2 and 81.0 or a decline of 34 per cent.
• The picture in regard to the State assemblies is even more revealing, with the average now being in the range of 20 to 50 sittings every year.
• The annual average of the number of bills passed by Parliament has come down from 68 in the decade 1952-1961 to 49.9 in the decade 1992-2001. Assurances given on the floor of the House are being fulfilled with lesser regularity.
• About 5.28 per cent of working time was lost due to disruptions in the 11th Lok Sabha. This rose to 10.66 per cent in the 12th Lok Sabha and to 18.95 per cent in the 13th. In the current Lok Sabha, 21 per cent of the time has been lost due to adjournments. The loss of time in the Rajya Sabha has been particularly high in recent years.
• Some of the lost time is made up by late sittings. Nevertheless, the impact of disruptions remains on the public mind. Party whips are mute spectators to such disruptions and thereby fail to discharge their primary duty of facilitating the functioning of the legislature.
• Political groups do not observe sufficient care in the selection of their representatives in legislatures. Nearly 23 per cent of MPs elected in 2004 had criminal cases registered against them; over half of these are cases of a nature that could lead to imprisonment of five or more years. The situation is worse in the case of MLAs. This too has a negative impact on public opinion.

Friends

You would recall that in 1997, on the occasion of the Golden Jubilee of our Independence, the two Houses of Parliament adopted unanimously an ‘An Agenda for India’ resolution. One section of it related to the need to preserve and enhance the prestige of Parliament. Three specific commitments were made in the resolution:

• Maintaining the inviolability of the Question Hour
• Refraining from transgressing into the official areas of the House, or from shouting slogans
• Desisting, invariably, from interruption or interference with the Address of the President of the Republic.

Ten years later, record shows that each of these solemn commitments has been observed in the breach. It is a damning indictment before the bar of public opinion and is viewed as such by the civil society and the media. It has done damage to the institution of elected legislatures and to the functioning of Indian democracy. One observer has chosen to describe our system as merely an ‘electoral democracy’.

Some questions unavoidably arise and beg for answers:

• Is not disruption of proceedings during the Question Hour a breach of privilege of individual members who await answers to admitted starred questions, and supplementary questions?
• Are members of legislatures immune to public opinion?
• Do members indulging in disruption understand the implications of being paid, full-time, public servants in the technical meaning of the term?
• Why can our legislators not function as legislators do in other democratic systems?

We need to remind ourselves that there is a difference in being a public figure and a legislator. Every public figure is not a legislator; the latter consciously accepts the obligations of his/her office and cannot accord a secondary place to his/her duties in the legislature. Regrettably, and often enough, the lure of the legislature is no longer for the laudable purpose of representation and is, instead, seen by some merely as a stepping stone to more attractive positions.

The deliberative functions of the legislature are decidedly in decline. All sides of the House bear responsibility for it. The Treasury benches shy away from substantive discussion of issues of public concern; the opposition prefers to resort to the so-called Zero Hour only to mention these issues in hyperbolic terms. Deliberation is thus reduced to a zero sum game. Policies are offered to the public as products; the electorate is denied a peep into the process.

The whole process reflects adversely on parliament as an institution of accountability in a democracy. This has serious implications for democracy itself.

What then can be done, by way of a corrective, to restore to parliament and other legislatures the centrality they should have and were intended to have? Such a corrective has to be at two levels simultaneously: to restore the sanctity of the Question Hour and to re-establish the legislature as the primary forum for debate on public policy. Perhaps the following could be considered by this conference and of the political parties represented here:

• Each member of a legislature, at the time of taking the oath of office, should subscribe to the three points relating to the functioning of Parliament mentioned in the 1997 Resolutions.
• The deliberative role of the Parliament must be restored by increasing the number of its sittings per annum to about 130 days. The comparative figures for the British and Canadian parliaments are in excess of 140. The US Congress is in session, on an average, for over 150 days in a year.
• If time is lost due to disruptions it should be compensated for, the same day, by sitting beyond normal hours.
• The Chair should take up with the whips, on a daily basis, incidents of violation of behavioural norms by members. The rule about naming members should be invoked whenever necessary.
• The practice of resisting debate, or mention, of contentious issues should be eschewed and both Government and Opposition should specifically commit themselves to deliberate on issues for which a request is made by at least one-third or one-fourth of the members of the legislature.
• Exceptions apart, interventions in debates are short on substance and long on rhetoric. One reason for this is the absence of a substantive research base at the disposal of many members. Such a base needs to be provided on the pattern of the Congressional Research Service in the United States.

Ladies and gentlemen

The writing on the wall is clear. The instrumentalities at the disposal of our legislatures have either been blunted or become dysfunctional. The single most important issue of concern today is the decreasing credibility of our legislatures as effective institutions capable of delivering public good and contributing to effective formulation of laws and public policy. What is needed is a review of the functioning of legislatures in their day to day work in order to optimise their productivity.

There are successful precedents to such an initiative. It will be recalled that in 1993 the Parliament created the Departmental Standing Committees to ‘make parliamentary activity more effective, make the Executive more accountable and to avail of expert and public opinion where ever necessary’. This has introduced depth in the consideration of legislative proposals; there is, of course, room for improvement, and for greater interaction with the public.

Friends

This is your 14th Conference. The functioning of parliamentary democracy depends in great measure on the manner in which you shoulder your responsibilities as whips. Your recommendations would be of great value.

The greater challenge, however, would be to implement them. We would do well to recall Dr. Ambedkar’s advice. ‘The working of the Constitution’, he said, ‘does not depend wholly upon the nature of the Constitution. The Constitution can provide only the organs of state such as the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. The factors on which the working of those organs of the state depends are the people and the political parties they will set up as their instruments to carry out their wishes and their politics. Who can say how the people of India and their parties will behave?”

I once again thank the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, Shri Dasmunsiji, for inviting me to inaugurate this Conference. I wish your deliberations all success.

Thank you.